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Consider the following activities:

	1.  An online community with thousands of members shares the hobby of surreptitiously installing “remote administration tools” (RATs) to take control of the computers of unsuspecting strangers.  Many of them do so for the purpose of spying on the users by turning on their webcams and microphones in order to watch and listen to them.  They post their experiences, tips, and trophies (in the form of stolen pictures, videos, and recordings they have made from webcams), to an online meeting site, featuring hundreds of thousands of posts.  The members of this subculture are almost exclusively men; their victims (whom they call their “slaves”) almost exclusively women (Anderson, 2013). 

	2.  The mammoth online news discussion site reddit.com features many forums that are benign or unexceptional, but some of its most popular forums and members have been devoted to sharing “creepshots,” photos of women taken surreptitiously, including one forum particularly for photos of adolescent and teenage girls referred to as “jailbait.”  Though these forums have been shut down (often more than once, since they are frequently revived with new names), at their high points they served tens of thousands of “subscribers” and millions of page-views per month.  Again, virtually all of the active users were men, and those whose photos are posted are almost all women (Chen, 2012).​[2]​

	3.  Rape and sexual assault are some of the most extreme varieties of sexual objectification.  In several recent cases of sexual assault, the abuse has been magnified when assailants have taken photos or videos of their assaults and then shared on the internet, in some cases becoming very widely viewed.  Some victims have become aware of being assaulted only as a result of photos or videos of their assaults circulating after the fact.  Such documentation adds to the trauma of the assaults by bringing much wider attention to the victims and the indignities they have suffered than would otherwise be the case.​[3]​

	Although the conduct just described is ethically problematic for many reasons, two of the most salient aspects of these cases are the way they are thoroughly gendered, and the way the actors involved disregard their victims’ lack of consent to the actors’ intentions.  In fact, the victim’s lack of willingness or consent seems to be a motivating factor in many of these cases.  At the time of my writing, 2013, it is not difficult to find free pictures and videos of naked women—conventionally beautiful women included—on the internet.  Largely these photos and videos have been made with the cooperation of the women in them, and sometimes by the women themselves.  Nonetheless, there remains a strong demand for pictures and videos made against the will of their female subjects—a demand which it seems cannot be explained by a shortage of pornography in general.  At least sometimes, the demands of men for women’s bodies seem to include that the woman refuse or be uninterested to satisfy that demand.

	These gendered predations involve essentially acts of sexual objectification, one of many possible forms of objectification.  “Objectification” is often used to name an ethical complaint that a person is being treated like (or merely like) a thing.  There would, however, seem to be many other practices of sexual objectification, such as consensual production of pornography, that lack some, most, or maybe all of the problematic features of the activities just described.  So it is of some interest to investigate in what ways, and under what conditions, sexual objectification is ethically problematic, and whether and how it might sometimes be unproblematic.

	One way to understand the problem of objectification derives from Kant, and holds that in treating someone like an object, one fails to give proper attention to her human personality, especially her potential for autonomous, rational choice.  A different worry comes from radical feminists, who argue that sexual objectification is a systemic problem that provides a key underpinning for male domination in a gender-based social hierarchy.  A question that I will attempt to clarify is whether one can accept the view of the radical feminists without condemning a lot of desires and activities which many people—including many people who are deeply committed to women’s social equality—find unproblematic and even valuable.  I will try to give some guidance as to how one might go about answering such a question, but answering this question will be beyond the means of this essay.

Personhood and Objectification via Kant

	The concept of objectification is of relatively recent origin, but manifests one of philosophy’s oldest problems, namely, how to reconcile the seemingly dual natures of humans:  our physical, material, thing-like construction, and our mental selves, including our apparently autonomous personalities.  This latter aspect is often taken to distinguish us from other material things and (possibly) from other animals, and is that which makes us both capable of ethical behavior and accountable for unethical behavior.  Yet people are material objects, and like other animals we have material needs and bodily desires.  Our survival and flourishing as a species depends on the fact that people sometimes make use of their own bodies and the bodies of others for their productive and sexual capacities, among other material attributes.  If these sorts of uses are to be ethically permissible, there must be some ways of engaging one another’s materiality that also respect their personality and autonomy.  The ethical writing of Kant is especially interested in how people can achieve and maintain rational autonomy despite their material, animal natures, so it is worth briefly examining his solution to this difficulty.

	Kant holds that while everything in the universe operates according to the laws of nature, a distinctive fact about humans, in contrast to other animals, is that they are able to act on the basis of laws that they themselves make and decide to follow.  This ability to decide to act on the basis of law (and not merely to conform to it, the way planetary trajectories conform to laws of motion) amounts to a kind of freedom, and constitutes a basis for human dignity and respect.  As such, it is the sort of thing no rational, self-respecting individual could choose to disregard (Kant, 1785/1993, Ak 4:387 (“Preface”)).  Kant goes on then to show that the law rational humans would decide on has a certain form—the famous “categorical imperative”—and ultimately that there are a number of implications for how humans should treat themselves and one another (Kant, 1785/1993, Ak 4:421-432 (“First Section”)).

	Given the important place that our rational nature plays in constituting our autonomy, Kant is especially concerned by the natural tendency of humans to act on the basis of sexual desire.  The strong pull of sexual desire often undermines the guidance of reason, and leads people to treat other people and themselves in particularly harmful, degrading ways.  In the interpersonal case, sexual desire for the body of another is a particularly common impetus for taking another person as a mere means to the satisfaction of one’s own animal desires, leading to a disregard for that person’s dignity and autonomy.  For Kant, the badness of this way of treating another person is not ameliorated by the possibility that both parties may feel similarly, and might mutually agree to engage in dehumanizing enjoyment of each other’s bodies.  In fact, Kant thinks that only marriage—a social institution, backed by the coercive force of the state—provides the possibility for individuals to make a suitable arrangement that would protect both parties’ moral personalities by ensuring that their rights of sexual access to the body of another are fully equal, reciprocal, exclusive, limited, and irrevocable.  Except in such circumstances, yielding to sexual desire for the body of another will amount to treating that person as a mere object of one’s lust and means to the fulfillment of one’s desires, rather than as an equal, rationally autonomous agent (Kant, 1797/1996, Ak 6:277-79 (“Marriage Right”)).

	Kant’s worries about sexual desire are not limited to desires for others:  Kant is similarly disdainful of masturbation.  In his discussion of “defiling oneself by lust” (he seemingly can’t believe decent people would speak openly of “masturbation”), he argues that what’s wrong with masturbation is that one discards one’s moral personality by treating oneself as a mere thing for the satisfaction of one’s carnal desires (Kant, 1797/1996, Ak 6:424-26 (“On Defiling Oneself by Lust”)).  Since this conduct only affects oneself, Kant does not believe it merits regulation by state coercion, but rather argues that it is inconsistent with the virtues that rationally autonomous agents would cultivate.  Kant is not, however, sparing in his condemnation of this way of disregarding one’s own moral personality:  he argues that it is a worse failure of virtue than even suicide, in that at least suicide requires a modicum of courage, whereas masturbation is a complete capitulation to one’s animality.

	Kant’s discussion of the problems of sexual desire highlights two possibly compatible but distinct concerns.  First, there is the possibility that individuals will treat persons (others or themselves) as mere means to the fulfilling of their own ends; in so doing, disregard a person’s rational autonomy.  Such treatment would be in any form: sex, commerce, friendship, etc.  Second, sexual desire to make use of the body of another (or oneself) is a sort of desire to engage in activity that is particularly harmful to autonomy—of both the subject and object—such that it is incompatible with autonomy except in very special circumstances (viz., within the confines of state-sanctioned marriage).  That is, sexual desire very problematic even between consenting adults, if they are not married to each other.  So, while there are many non-sexual ways in which one can act badly towards another that involve treating him as a mere means to one’s own ends, there is only a very narrow path by which one can act on one’s sexual desires while also treating oneself and others as autonomous ends-in-themselves, rather than as mere means.

	Unsurprisingly, even those who are today largely sympathetic to Kant’s ethics mostly find it hard to agree in full with his thoughts about sexual ethics.  Besides worries about his general sexism (evident elsewhere in his writings about women), there are good reasons to worry that marriage is no panacea, that his heteronormative assumptions are problematic for women and non-heterosexuals, and that his concerns about masturbation are foolish.  That said, both of the upshots highlighted above remain resonant with some people, and some feminists in particular have argued for positions not too distant from both of these claims.  Of particular interest is whether there is something about sex that makes even fully consensual sexual activity nonetheless a matter of ethical concern.

Modes of sexual objectification

	It will be useful at this point to say a bit more about the concept of objectification itself, and to introduce a couple of distinctions within the domain of objectification.  We might get a more practical window on what objectification involves by considering a number of the different ways people typically treat non-human objects and animals which seem unsuitable as ways of treating full-fledged human beings.  Martha Nussbaum (1995, 257) helpfully provides a list of seven qualities of the ways we treat objects that are (typically) ethically appropriate for objects but not for persons.  These include treating something instrumentally (as a means to one’s ends); as lacking in autonomy; as inert; as fungible; as violable; as subject to ownership; and as lacking in subjectivity.  This list is not intended to be exhaustive, and others have suggested additions to the list to highlight some of the more problematic aspects of human objectification (e.g., Langton, 2009, Chapter 10).  One notable feature of this list is that while it will capture many, perhaps all instances of sexual objectification, the list is not limited to sexual objectification: it encompasses a variety of ways that people can respond to the materiality of another person with indifference for her rational autonomy.  Sexual objectification is just one such way; treating someone as a punching bag, beast of burden, or subject of a science experiment are others.  

	Another interesting fact about objectification, as Nussbaum depicts it, is that it’s not all or always bad:  there are occasions and circumstances in which one might reasonably choose to be objectified by someone else, or to objectify oneself for one’s own pleasure (and perhaps that of someone else).  This fact reflects an appreciation that people are both rationally autonomous beings, but also material, intelligent animals who sometimes enjoy becoming immersed in their bodily experience, and released from higher-level concerns with self-governance.  Taking up a thought from Cass Sunstein, Nussbaum suggests that in some circumstances there is a desirable human good that can be obtained through giving oneself room to pursue bodily desires, attending particularly to the body of another, and shelving temporarily one’s rational autonomy and individuality.  Discussing an erotic scene from D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover, Nussbaum writes,

The surrender of autonomy and even of agency and subjectivity are joyous, a kind of victorious achievement in the prison-house of English respectability.  Such a surrender constitutes an escape from the prison of self-consciousness that, in Lawrence’s quite plausible view, seals us off from one another and prevents true communication and true receptivity (Nussbaum, 1995, 275; cf. Vogler, 1998).

The possibility that such objectifying activity will prove ethically unproblematic depends on its being couched in an ethical relationship involving care, respect, consensuality, and rough social equality, among other things, and this cannot be taken for granted.  But such circumstances are possible.  Supposing they prevail, this suggestion accepts Kant’s depiction of humans as creatures who sometimes desire to treat and be treated as something akin to a thing or perhaps an animal, but it disagrees with Kant about whether such treatment need always be regarded as unethical or dehumanizing.  While such immersion in bodily experience can easily go awry, there appears to be a valuable side of objectification which people can reasonably allow themselves to enjoy on occasion. 

	If objectification is sometimes morally problematic and sometimes not, how should we explain what makes the difference between problematic and unproblematic sorts?  One possibility is that the moral permissibility of objectification depends on whether the objectified party/ies enjoy being objectified by the party/ies doing the objectifying.  However, this simple standard is inadequate, since it makes the issue one that can only be judged after the fact, and makes it depend not on what the objectifying agent does, but on how it turns out.  A more promising approach pictures things this way:  as a default condition, everyone deserves to be treated by others as a rational, autonomous individual, and not like a mere object, in the ways Nussbaum describes.  Hence we may say each of us has a right against being objectified.  However, such a right may be waived by an individual, and permission given to someone to act on one’s body as a kind of object.  We would say then that the person who gives permission thereby consents to such treatment.  This picture is quite standard: it shows how individuals can exercise control over a troublesome kind of interpersonal activity through a system of rights which includes the possibility of waiving those rights.  Individuals with a right against objectification can then choose how and by whom they may be objectified if, and only if, she desires to be treated the way we treat mere objects.  So, on this picture, morally acceptable objectification is objectification by consent; morally objectionable objectification is objectification without consent.  And as the cases I discuss at the outset illustrate, it is obvious that there is an awful lot of non-consensual objectification in our society, especially of women. 

	However, “consent” seems to be too weak as a test as for whether objectification is desirable or undesirable from the perspective of the objectified person.  Consider cases where A objectifies B.  There seems to be a relevant difference between cases where A objectifies B because B specifically desires such treatment from A (or from someone, and A will do), and cases where B does consent but only in order to obtain some other good (e.g., because A is paying B to be a pornographic model for him), though has no particular desire to be rendered a sexual object.  While there may be reasons to allow individuals to consent to being objectified in exchange for other kinds of benefits, such situations raise the possibility that A is exploiting B, and that B consents to being objectified only for lack of better ways to make money.  Perhaps even then B is better off all things considered if someone will pay her to objectify her.  But the asymmetry in desires and rewards here suggests that B’s willingness to do something she otherwise does not desire reflects a position of weakness relative to those who are willing and able to pay for her objectification.  So it is ambiguous, at best, whether consensual objectification in which the objectified party takes no pleasure in her objectification is something we should count as compatible with respect for her rational autonomy.  What we can say for sure is that it fails to manifest the sort of salutary objectification Nussbaum describes.

	This discussion of consent to being objectified bears on the first of two distinctions I will use to facilitate subsequent discussion.  This is the distinction between objectifying oneself and being objectified by someone else.  At one pole, there is the phenomenon of self-objectification such as occurs when a person makes a pornographic photo or video of herself and sends it to a lover or posts it for public display.  At the other pole is objectification by another, with indifference to the objectified party’s (lack of) desire or consent, such as in the cases described at the start of this essay.  In between are cases where one party objectifies another with the latter’s consent, and would not do so without it.  Within this range, when A objectifies B at least in part because B likes it, and B participates enthusiastically and is gratified by it, then it is reasonable to count this as a case where B objectifies herself, since her participation with A appears to be fully voluntary, reflects her own interest in being objectified.  While it is hard to say how much actual objectification is self-objectification, in the sense described, it does not seem to be uncommon, especially if we look beyond the bounds of pornography to many other situations in which people intentionally display themselves as sexy, sexualized bodies for the erotic enjoyment of others.

	A second useful distinction is between objectifying one or more individuals directly—treating certain concrete individuals as “objects”—and objectifying one or more people  (usually a class of people) symbolically or ideologically, by depicting them as appropriately treated as objects.  Call these immediate and symbolic forms of objectification, respectively.  Though a single act may give rise to both forms of objectification simultaneously, they need not always occur together.  For instance, a pornographic photo may be taken by a man of his girlfriend, and shared with no one else, but treated simply as a memento or fetish item for his enjoyment of her.  It need not convey—to him or anyone else—any larger symbolic message about her or others.  Conversely, one might draw a female form (not based on anyone in particular) depicting a woman as a sexual object, and thereby symbolically objectify women in general by representing the female body as object, and as treated appropriately in the various ways that Nussbaum’s list suggests we typically treat objects.  But since the drawing is of no one in particular, no one is immediately objectified by it.

	While feminists have of course opposed many instances of immediate objectification—especially those that take place without the consent of the objectified party—they have been at least as intent on opposing symbolic objectification, holding it to be a key part of the maintenance of male gender dominance.  Such symbolic objectification occurs in numerous venues, such as advertisements, popular media (television, movies, pop songs, novels), jokes, and video games, but feminists have been especially critical of the pornographic movie and photography industry, from Playboy through to the most extreme forms of violent and degrading depictions of women as objects of sexual use and abuse.  These depictions of women as sexualized, consumable objects who lack a full complement of human qualities tend to produce a social understanding of women as inferior to men.  I’ll say more below about why this might be.

	The possibility and importance of symbolic objectification presents a potential difficulty for anyone who wants to allow that self-objectification can be benign.  Without denying that there can be pleasures and reasonable desires for self-objectification, there would seem to be no practical way to limit the effects of symbolic objectification to just those parties who would consent to be depicted as sexual objects.  If pornography affects the way the social imagination understands women in general, then even if everyone involved in making pornography consents enthusiastically to being immediately sexually objectified, it is clear that many of those who are symbolically represented by such activity do not consent to being treated as sexual objects, either immediately or symbolically.  Hence they may complain both that such activity prompts or encourages some of its consumers to immediately objectify some people without consent, and also (and because) that activity symbolically objectifies all women without their consent.

	Now one might object that the analysis leading to this objection is too quick and too broad, since the symbolic message of many instances of pornography might be more complicated than is suggested here.  Suppose that a pornographic film is made with the participation of only enthusiastic, consenting participants—that is to say, those clearly engaged in self-objectification (though with the assistance of others).  One might suggest that such a movie should be understood as conveying symbolically nothing more than the message that such self-objectification is permissible, which is to say objectification with (at a minimum) the consent of the participants.  If this is supposed to be its symbolic import, then one could object to construing it as symbolically objectifying or endorsing the immediate objectification of those who are not interested in being objectified.  If pornography says merely that women should have the option to engage in self-objectification (either by themselves or in cooperation with others), then it seems simply to expand the range of options open to women, without requiring anyone in particular to exercise such an option.

	This response leaves open the possibility that there will still be justified objections to particular genres of pornography that convey other, less respectful messages.  For instance, pornography that involves the glorification of violence against women does not appear to respect the importance of the requirement that she be able to consent or withhold consent.  Some such pornography depicts women accepting or taking pleasure in such violence.  This can still be very problematic, since merely accepting or even appearing to enjoy something is not the same thing as consenting to it:  someone who is subject to violence may do or say many things in hopes of alleviating the violence, protecting herself from an escalation of it, or aiming to appease her aggressor.  While there are people who engage in consensual uses of force, pain and constraint, to ensure that such practices are consensual requires participants to engage in explicit negotiation beforehand, combined with the ability of participants to withdraw consent (e.g., by use of a “safeword”) at any time things turn unwanted.  The sort of violence depicted in much violent pornography does not intimate that women have the right to control what happens to their bodies, and that their sexual choices should be made free from fear.  So the original objection to such symbolic objectification remains sound.

	Supposing that we can distinguish between symbolic objectification that respects the power of women to exercise or refuse consent to such objectification, and other symbolic objectifications that fail in this regard, it would seem that we might accept as benign pornography that engages in the first sort of symbolic objectification, while condemning other kinds of pornography.  Nonetheless, feminist concerns with pornography are not limited to the violent versions, but rather seem to pose objections to the full range of sexually objectifying representations of women (and men), and extend beyond pornography to the other ways Western culture treats women’s bodies as sexual objects on display for the enjoyment of men.  This raises the question of how to understand this broad objection to even consent-respecting sexual objectification.
	
Sexual objectification and gender hierarchy

	Kant, as I noted earlier, argued that the sexual use of the body was inherently problematic, whether consensual or otherwise, and was ethically permissible only if it was couched in very specific social constraints backed by the coercive power of the state.  While other, non-sexual sorts of objectification, such as Nussbaum lists, would also have merited ethical scrutiny, sexual objectification gave Kant particular pause because of the way sexual desire for the body of another person tends to undercut moral respect for him or her, in a way that, say, conducting medical experiments on the body of another does not.  

	The radical feminists have a similar degree of concern about sexual objectification, both non-consensual as well as consensual, but for quite different reasons.  Rather than seeing sexual desire as a natural drive that arises in individuals leading them to desire particular kinds of acts with particular kinds of bodies, Catharine MacKinnon argues that such desire is itself a socially constructed phenomenon that is developed as part of a larger system of gender domination.  That is, the common forms of male desire for certain sorts of female bodies and certain ways of interacting sexually with them is not principally a deliverance of our DNA, but rather is something people learn from the culture around them.  In the case of Western culture, the way men are attracted to and aroused by certain female bodies and body parts, and a corresponding induced set of female desires and values that complement those of men, is all contributory to a hierarchical structure that eroticizes male dominance and female subordination.  In this ideology, what makes women “sexy” is to be vulnerable, soft, yielding, physically constrained and bodily shaped in ways that undermine many forms of physical activity.  What makes men “sexy” is physical and social power, aggressiveness, ruggedness, strength, intelligence (to a point), and social standing (particularly in the eyes of other men).  While men’s and women’s bodies are both part of what makes each “sexy,” women’s bodies are valued as objects to be seen, touched, constricted, and penetrated, whereas men’s bodies are valued not so much for their visual appeal but for the kinds of things they are able to do:  work, fight, dominate, subdue, protect.  In short, men and women both are raised in circumstances that teach them to associate sexual desire and desirability with gender norms that empower and authorize men in general to dominate women, and disempower and delegitimize women from wanting or achieving social or sexual equality with men.

	MacKinnon takes up these themes in numerous places, with differing rhetorical emphases.  Here are two representative excerpts:

Pornography permits men to have whatever they want sexually.  It is their “truth about sex.”  It connects the centrality of visual objectification to both male sexual arousal and male models of knowledge and verification, objectivity with objectification.  It shows how men see the world, how in seeing it they access and possess it, and how this is an act of dominance over it.  It shows what men want and gives it to them.  From the testimony of the pornography, what men want is:  women bound, women battered, women tortured, women humiliated, women degraded and defiled, women killed.  Or, to be fair to the soft core, women sexually accessible, have-able, there for them wanting to be taken and used, with perhaps just a little light bondage.…
	Pornography is a means through which sexuality is socially constructed, a site of construction, a domain of exercise.  It constructs women as things for sexual use and constructs its consumers to desperately want women to desperately want possession and cruelty and dehumanization.  Inequality itself, subjection itself, hierarchy itself, objectification itself, with self-determination ecstatically relinquished, is the apparent content of women’s sexual desire and desirability (MacKinnon, 1989, 138-39 (notes in original omitted)).

	To be sexually objectified means having a social meaning imposed on your being that defines you as to be sexually used, according to your desired uses, and then using you that way.  Doing this is sex in the male system.  Pornography is a sexual practice of this because it exists in a social system in which sex in life is no less mediated than it is in representation.  There is no irreducible essence, no “just sex.”  If sex is a social construct of sexism, men have sex with their image of a woman.  Pornography creates an accessible sexual object, the possession and consumption of which is male sexuality, to be possessed and consumed as which is female sexuality.  This is not because pornography depicts objectified sex, but because it creates the experience of a sexuality which is itself objectified.  The appearance of choice or consent, with their attribution to inherent nature, is crucial in concealing the reality of force.  Love of violation, variously termed female masochism and consent, comes to define female sexuality, legitimating this political system by concealing the force on which it is based (MacKinnon, 1989, 140-41).

For MacKinnon, pornography and many other prominent media representations of women serve the function of creating social ideals of masculinity and femininity, to which heterosexuals expect themselves to aspire and hold each other to account for.  While individuals may diverge from these ideals in any number of ways, the power of these ideals is to establish patterns of normalcy, desirability, and common expectations such that conformity to these patterns is easier and (for many people) more likely to be rewarding than is divergence, at least for those for whom conformity is possible.  

	The real problem with these ideals, particularly for women, is that they place women in a socially subordinate position, and often lead to severely harmful impositions on them, such as rape, sexual assault, domestic violence, sexual harassment, sex discrimination in employment and education, bodily disfigurement, eating disorders, loss of the bases of social respect, and lives caught in a vise of between economic dependence and deprivation. These harms operate both directly on particular victims, as well as create a climate of fear for women, due to the constant threat that one may be subjected to any or all of these in the future.  Even for those who find that current gender ideals appeal and fit their desires splendidly, their broad uptake by society leads to conditions of significant inequality for women, and punishing harms for numerous individuals.

	Adding to MacKinnon’s critique, philosopher Rae Langton argues that the effect of pornography on women is to disempower women from being able to engage in certain crucial kinds of “speech acts,” such as to be able to meaningfully convey one’s refusal to consent to sex.  Langton holds that pornography conditions its viewers in a way that undermines the possibility of their understanding (or achieving “uptake”) of a woman’s refusal to consent.  Since pornography virtually never depicts a woman as sincerely declining an opportunity to engage in sexual activity, and similarly depicts men as unfailingly able to achieve their sexual aims with whatever women they desire, we should not be surprised if men glean from pornography a view that women are never truly unwilling to have sex with an appropriately aggressive man.  If that is so, then women are in a sense “silenced” from being able to perform the illocutionary act of refusing to consent to sex—since they cannot manage to get their intended audience to believe it when they are told “no” (Langton, 2009, 56-62).  Among other implications of this argument, it offers critics of pornography a rejoinder to the accusation that they aim to stifle the free expression of ideas:  pornography itself, they allege, has the effect of stifling an important kind of expression, thus making the regulation of pornography a means of facilitating at least one kind of speech.
	
Assessing the radical feminist critique of objectification

	The position of the radical feminists on pornography and objectification, especially MacKinnon’s writing, has drawn considerable criticism, including from many other feminists. It would be impossible to do justice to the arguments for and against these views in this short essay.  I will instead try to set out what I take to be some of the strongest considerations for and against their position, with a view to providing guidance for a fuller assessment.

	I think it is indisputable that women in the developed west are subject to widespread, involuntary objectification, and that many men engage in acts of immediate objectification of women without their consent.  Here, it is worth noting the prevalence of sexual assault against women, which is one of the more extreme forms of particular objectification.  According to the (U.S) National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey in 2010, 18.3% of women in the U.S. had been subjected to completed or attempted rape during their lifetimes, almost 80% before they reach the age of 25 (U.S. Center for Disease Control, 2010, 18 and 25).  In addition to rape, women are routinely subjected to various forms of taunting, groping, privacy invasion, and other forms of sexual harassment, as they go about their activities in public spaces.  Women’s appearance is also often subject to public comment by friends and strangers, treating their bodies as appropriate topics for critique or ridicule.  The kinds of involuntary visual objectification of women I depict at the start of this essay are possibly less common than some other forms, but are quite in keeping with the typical ways men impose their desires on women, especially on women who are not otherwise compliant with their wishes.  While some men are strongly resistant to engaging in such involuntary objectification, survey data suggest that many other men admit to engaging in sexual aggression (including rape and sexual coercion) (Thompson et al., 2011).  Such involuntary particular objectification imposed upon women by men presents a continuing obstacle to the ability of women to participate happily and equally in society.  It both undermines the happiness and security of those immediately affected, and signals to women in general that they need to be alert and to take precautions against the possibility of such dismissals of their autonomous personality.   This added burden on women contributes to the challenges women confront in leading lives with the same opportunities and satisfactions that men enjoy.

	One does not need to have much common ground with the radical feminists to be able to share their condemnation of these sorts of acts of immediate objectification, possibly on multiple grounds.  What distinguishes the radical feminist position is its objection to the symbolic objectification of women, on the grounds that it fosters and supports the sorts of immediate objectification just described.  While this is an empirical assertion, there does appear to be evidence of such a link.  While the relevant literature is too large to canvase here, some representative reviews of the literature conclude “the current results showed an
overall significant positive association between pornography use and attitudes supporting violence against women in nonexperimental studies” (Hald et al., 2010, 14), and “exposure to nudity actually diminished subsequent aggressive behavior, whereas nonviolent and violent pornography increased aggressive behavior (Allen et al., 1995a, 274; cf. Allen et al., 1995b).  Of course, any such empirical claim is subject to possible disconfirmation, either due to inadequacies of the extant research or changes in behaviour in the future.  However, the feminist explanation of this connection is at least plausible, and the current state of our knowledge makes it a reasonable hypothesis that at least some forms of pornography lead at least some men to treat women as sex objects regardless of the latter’s desires.  (For discussion of the reasonableness of this view, see Eaton, 2007.)  That is, it is reasonable to believe that the widespread symbolic objectification of women, and the frequent depiction of them as subordinate and compliant, encourages the belief that women’s expressions of desires or lack of desire need not be taken seriously.  Pornography’s symbolic message is often problematic for other reasons, too.  For one, it often reinforces a set of pernicious ideals for women’s bodies, propagating an unrealistic fantasy about what counts as beautiful and sexy, by comparison to which almost all women’s bodies fail to measure up.  Other problems include tendencies to normalize ageism, racism, ableism, and heterosexism.  These traits too, then, are likely to affect what men want in and from women, resulting in more difficulty in achieving satisfaction for both men and women, and putting an extra burden on women that men, by and large, do not have to meet.

	If these effects of pornography and other forms of symbolic objectification can be demonstrated, then even if most pornography is produced consensually and consumed by people who do not engage in involuntary objectification of women, the radical feminists would have secured an important part of their case against pornography and objectification.  In this light, a real conflict may exist between those who want to engage in practices that involve symbolic objectification, however consensual their participation may be, and those who are subjected to involuntary objectification by men whose views of women are distorted by pornography or other forms of symbolic objectification.   This is a conflict in that it appears impossible, at least in the short run, to promote both sets of interests, so at least one of the interested parties will likely suffer due in part to the activities of the other.  

	Is it fair to blame voluntary objectifiers (and those who enjoy them) for the bad actions of those they influence?  Just as murder mysteries and novels about sociopaths are not to be read as how-to books for would-be murderers and sociopaths, pornographic images and movies should not be taken as documentaries or sex-ed courses.  If some viewers learn the wrong lessons from such material (combined perhaps with a lot of wishful thinking), this is not obviously the fault of those who produce this material.  If in fact no such message is intended, it seems unfair to blame and interfere with those who engage in voluntary symbolic objectification for the way some (mis)interpret their message.

	But the issues here are not that simple.  Symbolic objectification, like any attempt at communication, takes place against a set of background conventions, meanings, expectations, and social structures, and so the messages it can convey are conditioned by the expressive conventions, etc., within which it occurs.  (Consider, for instance, how a similar set of oppressive background conditions make it difficult for at least some people to use various racial or ethnic epithets benignly.)  Moreover, some messages in pornography may be easier to misinterpret than others, and so should be communicated warily, and with clear disclaimers or counterpoint.  It’s also apparent that much pornography is made under far-from-ideal conditions, with performers whose participation is involuntary or barely voluntary, and who are thus not exhibiting their sexual self-determination.  If such pornography prompts its viewers to objectify others without consent, it’s probably not because they are misinterpreting its message.
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^1	  The author gratefully acknowledges support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada during the writing of this essay.
^2	  After this essay was originally drafted, a subsequent set of high-profile violations came to light when about 500 photos were surreptitiously stolen from the hijacked digital accounts of roughly 100 celebrities and subsequently posted onto internet forums for public viewing in August and September, 2014.  Many of these photos were nude or semi-nude “selfies,” taken by the celebrities for the private enjoyment of specific people.  Again, almost all of the victims were women, although the audience for them (very possibly numbering in the millions) surely included many women as well as men.  For relevant details, see the Wikipedia entry on “2014 Celebrity Photo Leaks.”  
^3	  Of recent note on this score are the rape of an intoxicated girl, 16, in Steubenville, Ohio, in August, 2012; a sexual assault of a girl, 16, in Pitt Meadows, BC, in September, 2010; and the case of Jonathan Richard Hock, an Arizona man who streamed live and recorded an assault on his unconscious girlfriend in June, 2009.
